

The DNS Abuse Institute

Survey of ML Approaches to
Preventing Abuse

The DNS Abuse Institute

- Project of Public Interest Registry
- Mission: Reduce DNS Abuse
- Education, Collaboration, Innovation
- NetBeacon™
- DNSAI: Compass™
- ZOMFG FREE

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
Can we predict potentially abusive domain names *before* the abuse has happened?

(as in, before an abusive website resolves or email is sent)

And now for an important note about outcomes...

- *Detecting* potentially abusive names doesn't presuppose an action
- Detection could lead to everything from nothing, to deletion of domain
- Plenty of room for reasonable, responsible processes

Using what data?



Timeline

Date	Name	What
April 2016	nDEWS: A new domains early warning system for TLDs .nl	DNS Lookups and Reg data
24 October 2016	PREDATOR	Primarily aimed at bulk registrations
January 15, 2019	PaDAWaNS: Proactive Domain Abuse Warning and Notification System .nl	Fraudulent web shops
2019	Domain Watch .uk	Domain based
09 December 2019	PREMADOMA .eu	Primarily aimed at bulk registrations
27 March 2021	Proactive Recognition of Domain Abuse	Thesis / SIDN Labs
27 January 2023	RegCheck .nl	SIDN Labs

Who has ML detection in production?

- SIDN / .nl – RegCheck
- EURid / .eu – PREMADOMA
- Nominet / .uk – NameWatch
- Others?

Three Approaches

- Registration Based – Is the domain likely to have been part of an abusive bulk registration?
- Domain Based – Does the domain have attributes commonly found in abusive names (brands, special terms)
- Registrant Based – Is the registrant information ‘correct’

Class Imbalance Problems

- Abuse is still a tiny fraction of new registrations
- Requires real work to train and balance ML models

Precision & Recall

Precision: Of the predicted abusive names, how many were actually abusive?

Recall: How many of the total abusive names were correctly predicted?

- Domain Watch: 60% precision
- RegCheck (live): 22.08% precision, 47.80% recall
- Premadoma (testing): 84.57% precision, 66.23% recall

Is that good? Good is really about what you do with it.

Potential Issues

- Do registration attribute based models become less relevant as targeting abuse becomes cheaper and easier?
- Will we see abuse move to more sub-domains?
- Are threat feeds reliable/complete enough for training?

...so, why only (ccTLD) registries?

- ccTLDs have different economics, incentives, and regulatory requirements
- ccTLDs are also more willing to share their work
- Kudos to SIDN Labs for their significant transparency and contributions

Registrar Approaches

- Far more useful data, especially at the transaction layer
- Overlaps with anti-fraud tools typically from payment processor
- Develop and employ own ML model vs. Pay \$0.07 more a transaction?

Sources

- nDEWS
- PREDATOR
- PREMADOMA
- PaDaWans
- Domain Watch
- Regcheck from SIDN, built on this thesis.